Book Answers Catholic Political Split With a Bold Third Way

Becket Fund for Religious Liberty Senior Counsel William Haun has written the book that Catholic scholars and legal practitioners in the United States have desperately needed. His just-released Not to Caesar but to Peter: Why the Catholic Church is a Perfect Society helps Catholics to think clearly about the Catholic Church’s place within our constitutional order. Haun’s work is unique in that it begins from the Church’s own self-understanding rather than from the vantage point of a purported liberal neutrality.

In recent decades, the growth of the state and the increasingly stringent demands of secularism have led to more and more conflicts between the state and large institutional religions. In particular, America’s largest and most institutional religion has experienced friction with policies that, from the Church’s point of view, prevent her from governing herself and pursuing her mission as she sees fit. Her lawyers will invoke the language of a ministerial “exception” and accommodation from otherwise generally applicable law so that she may organize herself and carry out her spiritual mission. Scholars and practitioners have found it perplexing to explain why the Church should be given “special” treatment in American public law to justify these exemptions, exceptions, and accommodations. It is indeed difficult to articulate a reason from within the horizons of philosophical liberalism as to why the Church, as something other than a purely voluntary association of individual believers, deserves special treatment. Be that as it may, Haun demonstrates that American and Catholic history are more capacious than strict liberal theory in terms of recognizing the rightness of enabling the Catholic Church to act unburdened by state control in order to govern her own affairs and carry out her spiritual mission.

Haun proposes and applies the framework of “legal pluralism” to American religious liberty jurisprudence, which essentially means that American civil law should accept that there are, in reality, multiple legal jurisdictions operating within and upon the very same community, a political and a spiritual authority. Each authority has and enforces its own law. The alternative to “legal pluralism” is what Haun calls “monism,” the idea that the sovereign state is the source of all authority. Liberal “monism” imposes a single, supposedly neutral vision of the human person on every institution within the physical borders of the state. Institutions that cannot be tamed through monism are thereby deemed unfit for supervised toleration. The key to legal pluralism, according to Haun, is reawakening the Catholic Church’s understanding of herself as a “perfect society” in the Aristotelian sense: a morally imperfect but complete and self-sufficient society with her own sacramental means and legal authority to attain the end of eternal life with God. Not only is legal pluralism more in line with the Catholic Church’s understanding of herself, but it also has the advantage of being more compatible with the on-the-ground sociological and historical reality of the Christian West and the United States. It is not the case that the American Founders as a group—not to mention their fellow citizens—simply accepted Locke’s theory on church and state matters as true and agreed to tolerate the Catholic Church only insofar as Catholic citizens subordinated their religion to the limits of liberalism. Instead, the existence of an institutional religion that made big claims for itself within our borders was accepted as a matter of fact, and the religion clauses of the First Amendment were adopted in a country in which it was already taken for granted that Catholics would be tolerated. As George Washington noted in his 1790 letter to Roman Catholics, the American people would not forget the “patriotic part” that Catholics played in the War for Independence, nor could they forget the essential contribution made by Catholic France.

Haun’s intellectual courage when addressing the underpinnings and implications of the Church as a perfect society is especially commendable. Because Haun is one of the nation’s top legal advocates for religious liberty and a defender of the Church’s articulation in Dignitatis Humanae of a civil immunity in matters of religion from coercion within due limits, one might expect him to be embarrassed by Catholic teaching on Church and state that preceded 1965. Rather than joining the fashionable attack on critics of liberalism, Haun is at pains to demonstrate his shared commitment with various postliberals and even “integralists” to an “ideal” of Christendom that Haun does not believe was discarded by Dignitatis Humanae. He points to various provisions of that text, including its statement that it “leaves untouched traditional Catholic teaching on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.” As it happens, this is one of only a few lines from Dignitatis Humanae that were quoted verbatim by St. John Paul II during his first visit to America as pope in 1979. Haun embraces not only Dignitatis Humanae but also Leo XIII’s Immortale Dei, which invokes a body-soul analogy to implicitly defend an indirect temporal power of the spiritual authority and posits a cooperative relationship between Church and state that bears in mind the superior end and origin of the spiritual authority.

Haun agrees with Leo XIII — and many postliberals — when he defends a version of the indirect temporal power doctrine that flows from the idea that the Church is a perfect community. St. Robert Bellarmine classically explained that the authority of the pope is “properly and in itself a spiritual authority, and therefore it directly deals with spiritual matters as its primary object.” At the same time, the pope has a temporal authority “indirectly… whenever spiritual matters are concerned.” Bellarmine invokes various examples from the apostolic age to demonstrate the recognition of this authority in sacred scripture, including St. Paul’s admonition to the Christians in Corinth to keep their disputes with one another out of the civil courts — an admonition whose authority Luther and Calvin would have difficulty making sense of, given their denial of any indirect temporal power of the spiritual authority. The indirect temporal power principle did not disappear after the Counter-Reformation. In 1927, Jacques Maritain defended the “unchangeable” indirect power doctrine and explained that “to refuse the spiritual power the right to intervene in politics is to deny the existence of an independent spiritual power” because such a refusal would give jurisdiction over the spiritual to the temporal by suggesting that “moral values affecting political acts depend upon the temporal power alone.”

In Not to Caesar but to Peter, Haun explains that the Church’s competency is “not limited to defining matters of faith and morals,” but that it “extends to what is necessary for man to achieve his supernatural end.” This extension could include matters that might be regarded as “temporal.”

A less responsible thinker than Haun could articulate these same principles as a revolutionary call against the American political project, due to our nation’s alleged commitment to liberal monism. Haun, on the other hand, demonstrates that there is room for legal pluralism—and its accompanying implications — within the American political tradition. The most stirring and well-known argument for religious liberty from our own political tradition is James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, which grounds a right to religious freedom in the duty that all men have to render worship to God, a duty that precedes and transcends obligations to the civil order. Haun cleverly—and persuasively—shows that Madison’s argument is a kind of jurisdictional argument, and claims that the “perfect society” framework could help make sense of Madison’s argument at its deepest level, rendering Madison’s argument even more compelling going forward.

Moving from American first principles to the tradition of American jurisprudence, Haun shows that America’s early religious liberty cases are a far cry from an orthodox application of Lockean liberalism that would treat the Church as a purely voluntary community whose members enjoy toleration by the monistic state by virtue of the fact that their religious views have not run afoul of what the state has determined are the criteria most essential to public peace and prosperity. Rather than treating religious authorities as voluntary communities under the sovereign’s careful supervision, 19th-century case law treats spiritual authorities as parallel authorities. This brings the American legal tradition closer to the “perfect society” framework than to the liberal “monism” framework. For example, in Watson v. Jones (1871), the Supreme Court recognized the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical tribunals on decisions pertaining to church property disputes. Not to Caesar but to Peter makes a strong case that the societas perfecta framework can be at home within the American political and legal tradition.

As a religious liberty practitioner, Haun is extremely familiar with the Catholic Church’s usual rhetorical attitude toward religious liberty in this country: that the Church should be seeking out special “exemptions” and “accommodations” as a supplicant to the monistic state. Haun recommends that the Church instead elevate the language of jurisdiction and authority over the language of exemption and accommodation, as important as exemption and accommodation might be in our contemporary legal context. Haun hopes that over time this shift could shape cultural attitudes toward religious liberty more broadly, which would then give our society a better grasp of the religion clauses through a healthier understanding of the societas perfecta framework that can be deciphered in our nation’s history and tradition.

Haun is emphatic that nothing in his argument demands a departure from loyalty and gratitude to the American political project. The jurisdictional “perfect society” framework is welcome here, and that framework can be deepened and developed in our constitutional traditions. At the same time, Haun warns, we must be wary of rival understandings that were conceived in the Protestant world but are especially enticing in a post-Protestant secularized world. The first is the “two kingdoms” thesis that separates the two authorities for the purpose of strictly cabining spiritual authority to those matters that are purely spiritual, such as preaching, while giving the temporal authority the final say over every “mixed” matter such as marriage, education, and even church leadership. This false understanding easily succumbs to the “monism” of the sovereign liberal state because the temporal authority is the one to judge which matters are actually “purely spiritual.”

The other rival and inadequate understanding is a “self-oriented conception of conscience” that minimizes or even rejects authorities apart from the sovereign state and the sovereign individual. Not only is such a conception false, but it leads invariably to human misery and even the soft tutelary despotism predicted by Tocqueville. Just as St. Robert Bellarmine’s arguments were intended to distinguish the Catholic position from the divine-right absolutism of James I, which would deny political equality and eliminate the importance of consent from the political community, his successors today can invoke the “perfect society” framework to vindicate human freedom, rightly understood, by preserving authority outside of the individual and the state.

To American postliberals and “integralists” who worry that official recognition of religious holidays, Sunday closing laws, support for religious schools, public prayer, and even public recognition of religion are forbidden by the First Amendment, Haun insists that the American religion clauses make room for each of these initiatives. We do not need to throw out the religion clauses or the Constitution in order to advocate for decent laws or practices that foster the religious life of our citizens, as Dignitatis Humanae envisions.

Haun’s work on Church and state in America offers a bold and refreshing perspective that doesn’t shy away from the most startling claims of the Catholic Church or indeed from America’s own prized texts or traditions. Every religious liberty scholar and advocate, as well as every Catholic who wants a clearer understanding of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the American Constitution, should read this book and refer to it frequently.

William Haun speaks on the thesis of Not to Caesar but to Peter Oct. 28 at Benedictine College.

Images: Wikimedia, Angelico Press

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